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Appellants respectfully submit the following Appellants1
Brief to this Honorable Court.

DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Designation
Plaintiff

Party
Plaintiff.
Appellant.

Name
Patricia Christiansen

Defendant and Third
Party Plaintiff.
Appellant.

Holiday Rent-A-Car d/b/a
Flexi-Lease Inc. and Devon
K. Hammer (Hammer included
in case title by error, not
a party).

Holiday

Third Party Defendants.
Respondents.

Harold T. Hinckley and Rex
Howell d/b/a Airport Shuttle
Parking/ Holiday's lessor.

Airport

Intervening Plaintiffs.
Appellants.

Don and Beverly Maw
(Present owners of Holiday)

Maw

Additional Third
Party Defendants.
Appellants.

David Lingard, John Lingard,
Craig Lingard.
(Former owners of Holiday.)

Lingards

Unnamed Defendant.
Unnamed Respondent.

Home Insurance Company.
(Insurer of Airport.
Appellants claim also insurer
of Holiday.)

Home

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff had a massive personal injury claim against
Holiday, a small company, which shared business premises and fire
and liability insurance with its lessor, Airport, another small
company, insured by Home. Home and Aiport refused to defend Holiday
resulting in Holiday's assigning its rights against Airport and
Home to plaintiff and consenting, with the knowledge of Home and
Airport, to plaintiff's default judgment against it in the

amount of $246,000, which sum plaintiff, Holiday and its owners,
Maws and Lingards, seek now to recover from Airport and Home.

DISPOSITIONS IN LOWER COURT
Three judges made final and binding rulings on different
aspects of the case.
Judge Philip S. Fishier gave plaintiff judgment against
Holiday in the amount of $246,033.08.

This is a final judgment

entered October 1, 1982, which has not been appealed.
The aspect of the case concerning whether Airport had
obligated itself to extend its insurance to Holiday was tried
before Judge David B. Dee., Based on a jury finding that Airport
had in fact made a contractual obligation to extend its insurance
to Holiday, Judge Dee entered judgment to that effect and with
the consent of Airport and Home, included in the judgment that
Home's policy of insurance was in force covering Airport.

This

judgment entered October 6, 1982, is also final and not appealed.
Finally, opposing motions were made before Judge Scott
Daniels for summary judgment.

Plaintiff and Holiday contended

that based on the judgment of Judge Dee, as a matter of law, the
Home insurance extended to plaintiff's claim, that her default
judgment should be affirmed in amount as to Home and Airport, and
that Airport and/or Home should pay plaintiff's claim.
Airport and Home contended that plaintifffs default judgment was collusive and should be set aside, that Airport had
breached its obligation to extend its insurance to Holiday so

that Airport was uninsured as to Holiday,and so should be found
liable to Holiday but only on breach of contract, i.e., the
$15,000 cash Holiday had actually paid plaintiff, rather than
the amount of plaintiff's judgment, and that Home had no obligation to either Airport or Holiday on claims originating against
Holiday.
Judge Daniels, in two rulings, refused to affirm the
amount of plaintiff's judgment, but also refused to set it aside
as collusive; granted Holiday judgment against Airport that it
was liable to Holiday for plaintiff's claim but limited the
amount of that recovery to the out-of-pocket cash actually paid
plaintiff by Holiday on the basis of breach of indemnitee agreement rather than failure to insure.
Airport and Home have not appealed Judge Daniel's summary
judgments and as to them it is final.
Appellants accept Judge Daniels' ruling that Airport is
liable to Holiday for plaintiff's claim, and his ruling that the
judgment is not collusive, but appeal his refusal to find that
Home's insurance extends to plaintiff's claim and his ruling limiting the amount Holiday can recover from Airport.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek the following relief:
1. That plaintiff's judgment be affirmed in amount as to
all parties;
-3-

2. For a determination that plaintifffs claim is covered
under the Home insurance policy.
3. For a ruling that Home stands as a real although unnamed party, and is bound by these proceedings,.
4. For plaintiff's fees as assignee of Holiday to its
insurance, costs and such other relief as the court deems proper,
5. Appellants Holiday, Maws and Lingards claim reimbursement of attorney fees and costs for this appeal.

(They may seek

to file supplemental briefs in connection with this appeal.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Facts of Accident
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of parties, the case's
facts were and still are essentially straightforward.
What the case involves is a confrontation between an injured plaintiff and two small businesses, Holiday and Airport,
on the one hand, and the insurer on the other.

That is, what

happens when an insurer refuses to defend and none of the parties
are capable of paying the damages arising from a personal injury?
The case complexities arise from this refusal of the insurer, Home, to defendant Holiday, and its maneuvers which left
its named insured, Airport, itself uninsured.

For this reason,

Appellants felt it appropriate to break the Statement of Facts
into two sections, first concerning the relationship of the
parties and plaintiff's injury, and the second, about the litigation itself.

At the time plaintiff's accident occurred, in the Holiday
carwash, on February 29, 1980, she was an employee of Airport at
2085 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah,
Airport provided a parking lot for air travelers at lower
rates than at the Salt Lake International Airport, and a continuously running shuttle bus service took the travelers directly to
and from their cars to the individual door of the airline they
would be using.

It even had a nice touch of taping a dime on the

customer's parking receipt so the customer could call Airport on
arrival at the terminal and have the shuttle bus en route while
he was picking up his luggage.
At the Airport premises, it leased a number of separate
buildings to various small businesses.

Each of these were re-

quired under their leases with Airport to maintain complete insurance which also indemnified Airport against any claims against
the lessees that might also involve Airport.
Within the building that Airport occupied was a carwash.
Airport used this frequently, but not continuously.
The possibility for a symbiotic relationship arose when
Airport and Holiday discussed sharing a joint co-tenancy.

Holi-

day was an existing car rental business near the airport and
most of its rentals were with air travelers.
Holiday, to operate its business, needed only a customer
counter and a carwash to keep its cars clean.

The customer ser-

vice counter in the Airport building was large enough to accomodate the clerks of both businesses, so it was arranged that
-5-

Holiday would rent space from Airport, that space being the carwash and part of the counter and parking for its cars.
The advantage to both businesses is obvious.

For air

travelers arriving from out-of-state, they could use the Airport
shuttle and then rent a car from Holiday.

This would increase

the number of customers for both.
Airport discussed the matter with Gene Denning, an agent
with Fred Moreton & Company, who had Airport covered on a comprehensive policy of insurance written by Home (R394-424).

This

insurance covered fire, liability, personal property, vehicle
operation and all phases of Airport's business.

It made sense

to have both companies share a single insurance policy, if this
could be done.

While items such as personal property should be

separately covered under separate policies, and each was entirely
independent in operation of its own vehicles, still certain areas
were matters of common concern.

These were fires and liability

claims arising on the premises, where either or both might be
responsible.
Mr. Denning spoke only to Airport, but in speaking to
Airport, he advised that due to the co-mingling of space, a separate policy of insurance for Holiday was not necessary because
Holiday could be added to Airport's existing policy for fire and
liability coverage simply by having Airport and Holiday provide
for that in their lease (R280 L8-R282 L15)•

Mr. Denning testified:
"A, My discussions at that time were that if there
was a hold harmless agreement or indemnification
clause in the lease agreement/ that then the
insurance policy ... . ,f [Emphasis added.]
(R382 L13-15)
At this point, he was abruptly

cut off in his answer and

cautioned not to make any reference to an actual policy being in
force.

The questioning continues as follows starting on the next

line, L16, R382:
"Q. Excuse me. Excuse me.
there.

Let me touch out front

A. OK.
Q. OK. Its just without reference to any policy or
anything, sir."
The reason Mr. Denning was cut off was that the attorney
hired by Home to represent Airport at the trial before Judge Dee
on the issue of whether Airport had a contractual obligation to
extend its insurance to Holiday had brought an in limine motion
before Judge Dee at the outset of the trial.
During the hearing of that motion, Home's attorney, Mr.
Stevens, told Judge Dee that he was advised by Mr. Denning that
Mr. Denning would testify that the Home Insurance policy was in
force covering Airport and covering Holiday.

Mr. Stevens objec-

ted to that testimony on the ground of being on the ultimate issue,
if the jury heard it, they would certainly find a contractual
obligation existed to provide that very insurance (R371 LI 5R372 L6; R374 L21-25).

Dale Lambert, representing Holiday, argued that the
matter of insurance was inextricably bound up with the evidence
in the case and had to go before the jury (R375 L2-11).
Judge Dee ruled that Mr, Denning could be questioned concerning the conversations about insurance,but could not state the
insurance was in force (R376 L9-16).

Hence, the interruption of

his testimony as so vividly shown in the transcript.
Based on this advice of Mr. Denning, Holiday and Airport
put in their lease a clause that they would share the cost of fire
and liability insurance, an add-on to the lease providing:
"Lessee agrees to pay 50% of all utility bills, maintenance, property taxes and insurance (liability &
fire) that pertains specifically to that one building.11
(R392)
In reliance on this, Holiday let lapse its existing liability

insurance (R366 %2) when it moved in with Airport.
Mr. Denning advised the parties that they did not have to

have Holiday named as an insured nor fill out papers because its
inclusion as an insured was automatic as far as the policy was
concerned on the fulfilling of two conditions.

These were (1)

that they be co-tenants of a single building, and (2) that their
lease provide that they share the insurance.

He based this advice

on the Home policy.
The insurance policy covers liability insurance at §11.E.
(R402) stating;

-8-

"Coverage E: Liability: This company will pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury or property damage to
which this insurance applies, due to an occurrence,
and this Company shall have the right and duty to
defend any
suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property
damage... . " (R402 fl) [Emphasis added.]
The word "damages" as used in the policy would have its
customary meaning.

The first definition for damages given in

Black's Law Dictionary is,
"A pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may
be recovered in the courts by any person who has
suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether to
his person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another."
Mr. Denningfs advice that Airport not be a named insured
in the policy was proper because in the policy's definition section, it provided the following clause - an alternative method:
"Insured Contract. Insured Contract means any written
(a) lease of premises; (b) easement agreement ... ."
[Emphasis added.] (R402 5IV, Definitions.)
When an insured has entered into an "Insured Contract
through a "lease," the named insured is then "legally obligated"
to pay "damages" based on the "insured contract" for claims
against the co-tenant and the insurer will "pay" those claims.
The policy verifies this in its Exclusions section where
it states:
"This policy does not apply: (e) under coverage (E),
to liability assumed by the insured under any contract or agreement except an insured contract ... ."
(R403, Exclusions, (e))

-9-

After the parties had commenced their

co-tenancy,

Mr. Denning visited the premises, observed Holiday in its shared
operation and approved the arrangement (R385 LI 4-19)•
Mr. Denning also testified specifically that no insurance application for Holiday was required for the coverage to
be in force (R389 L20-R390 L19), and that no certificate of insurance naming Holiday was required (R383 L18-R384 L3), the
"insured contract" taking the place of these customary documents.
When plaintiff's claim against Holiday was first presented, Holiday immediately referred it to Airport and Home.
Home refused to defend.

Its original basis was not that there

wasn't any agreement to share the insurance, but rather that
Holiday had breached the agreement by not paying its 50% share
of the cost of the insurance.

Airport's defense was stated thus:

"THIRD DEFENSE
"Any agreement between third-party plaintiff and
third party defendants pursuant to which insurance
would be procured required third-party plaintiff
to pay premiums for said insurance. Third-party
plaintiff failed to pay any such premiums and,
therefore, is not entitled to any insurance coverage." (R119)
This answer admits by implication the agreement to insure
or it wouldn't have a claim that an agreement existed to be
breached by Holiday.
At trial before Judge Dee to determine whether Airport
had contracted to extend its insurance to Holiday, this contention of Airport's Answer was rebutted by Mr. Hinckley's own testimony that Holiday hadn't paid Airport in cash because it serviced

and washed the Airport shuttle buses as a quid pro quo work
trade off (R551 L16-R554 L25). This led to the verdict:
"We, the jury, find from a preponderance of the
evidence in this case the following answer to the
question propounded to us:
1. That Airport Shuttle contracted or agreed to
provide liability insurance protecting Holiday RentA-Car by promising to arrange to have Holiday covered
under Airport Shuttlefs liability policy?
ANSWER: Yes_X
No.

"

(R248)

With the facts confirming insurance coverage existing
between Airport and Holiday outlined above, we turn now to the
facts of plaintiff's injuries.
Plaintiff was a shuttle bus driver for Airport.

She

returned from a shuttle bus run, passed the counter shared by
the employees of both companies, and stepped through the door
leading into the car wash and service area to get a drink at the
water fountain in the wash room.
The car wash drain was plugged so Holiday employees had
removed a man-hole cover to clean the drain.

This man-hole was

set a foot from the door leading from the counter area.
hole cover was painted the same color as the floor.

The man-

Holiday's

employees did not tell plaintiff of this work, nor put a warning
sign on the door, nor even leave the door open so that the manhole could be seen.

As a result, when the plaintiff went through

the door, she stepped directly into the open man-hole with her
right leg.

The man-hole opening had a sharp metal rim.
fell half the length of her body.

Plaintiff

Her left leg had not gone

into the hole so her left buttock hit the floor and simultaneously
her back smashed against the metal rim.

This fall caused a com-

bination side-ways wrenching of her body and injury to her back.
Her injuries were so severe that on first examination,
her doctor advised her she could not return to work for a minimum of a number of months.
Shortly after this accident occurred, and while plaintiff
was receiving Workmen's Compensation but had filed no suit, the
owners of Holiday, the Lingards, sold the business to the Maws.
Both were aware of plaintiff's injury and provided in their contract of sale that should plaintiff bring an action, the Lingards
would indemnify the Maws.
To enforce this indemnity agreement is why the Maws and
Lingards are in this suit, an action that would not have been
necessary had Home defended Holiday.
In the time since the accident, the initial injuries have
somewhat healed and are not by themselves disabling.
lem arose during plaintiff's convalesence.
commonly called fibrositis.

The prob-

There is a condition

This is somewhat the muscular

equivalent of arthritis in the joints.

Like arthritis, it can

range from a mild irritation to disabling and exquisitely painful extremes.
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As arthritis frequently arises from trauma to a joint,
fibrositis frequently arises when muscles in the back respond
by bloating with fluid in order to protect themselves from movement when subject to severe

continuous pain.

The process is

somewhat similar to the swelling which arises when an ankle is
sprained and which serves as naturefs splint tending to immobilize the ankle and to warn the victim not to use it by giving
intense pain signals.
The affidavit of Dr. Robert Baer, president of the Utah
branch of the AMA in physiatry(rehabilitation medical practice)
was submitted (R181-R186) to Judge Fishier at the time of plaintiff's default judgment.
read in its entirety.

It is suggested that the affidavit be

While a sprained ankle involves only an

ankle, Dr. Baer, in his affidavit, swore/ in September, 1982:
"Present condition includes some residual component
of the lumbar and cervical strains but it is aggravated to an extreme degree by fibrositis through
her paravertebral muscles running the length of her
spine on either side and into the muscles of her
hips. Her present condition is disabling and she
has been disabled from the ability to work since
the original accident on February 29, 198 0, except
she would have been capable during the last year of
extremely limited part-time employment of about
three hours per day provided that the employment
involved no active physical duties and no stationary positions ... ." [Emphasis added.]
(R182 L6-15)
Dr. Baer continues:
"Fibrositis is an incurable condition and not treatable through surgery. Fibrositis is an inflammatory
hyperplasia of white fiborous tissue of the body,
especially of the muscle sheaths and fascial layers
of the locomotor system. It is marked by edema of

the involved muscles which causes the muscles to
be distended even when the patient is irelaxed causing substantially reduced blood circulcition to the
involved areas and extreme physical pain. In a
severe and advanced condition of fibrositis, such
as Pat has, the pain is disabling." [Emphasis
added,] (R182 L21-29)
At the time of the entry of the default judgment before
Judge Fishier, Judge Fishier had before him not only Dr* Baer's
affidavit but plaintifffs affidavit (R187-R189).

These affi-

davits set forth plaintiff's economic and personal losses.
Plaintiff's losses are summarized in the affidavit of
James E. Hawkes, her associate counsel (R362-364) as being special
damages of wage loss and medical expense to October 1, 1982, of
$27,160.65, interest on the special damages of $7,287.93 from
date of accident, a minimum future wage loss of $50,146.00 and
minimum future medical expense of $61,438.50.
$146,033.08.

These total

To this was added her request for $100,000.00

for damages not covered by specific figures.

Judge Fishier,

being advised, gave her judgment as requested for $246,033.08.
Home's attorney was present at the hearing.
Had plaintiff submitted her case to a jury, she would
have asked for a higher amount.
The judgment is large because it should be.

Plaintiff is

divorced, raising four children, and her employment is a matter
of necessity, not choice. She lives with disabling pain.

Facts Concerning Litigation
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that Home
has repeatedly taken a position adverse not only to Holiday, but
also to its named insured Messrs, Hinckley and Howell, dba Airport
Shuttle Parking,
At the outset of this case, Home's attorney took the sworn
statements of Mr. Hinckley and Mr. Howell.

Plaintiff was not ad-

vised of this nor was Gerald Nielsen, representing the Maws.

Dale

Lambert representing Holiday was advised at the last moment and
attended that session.
Not being subject to cross-examination, the sworn statements were not admissible in evidence.

They would, though, serve

to impeach Home's insureds should they later attempt to assert
that they did have a contract to share their insurance with Holiday.
Counsel cannot recall an occasion when he has taken sworn
statements of his own clients.

Depositions on occasion if the

client may not be present at trial, but sworn statements, never.
People do not know if they have a binding contract.

They

submit their facts to their attorney and he applies the legal
criteria such as meeting of the minds, clarity of terms, consideration and so forth, and tells them whether they have a contract or not.
If there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the attorney works with the
client to develop the facts in the light most favorable to the position the client wants.
For example, when there is uncertainty, if the person has
a contract to sell a home and wants the sale to go through, with

the assistance of his attorney, he will develop the facts showing
the contract should be performed.

If he doesn't want the sale

to go through, he will develop the facts indicating the contract
is not complete.
Airport was not actually brought into the lawsuit until
1982, the parties before then trying to get Home to extend coverage.

By the time Airport was brought in, represented by Home,

it knew that plaintiff had a large case.
There are those personal injury attorneys who say they
have observed a pattern of insurers in large personal injury claims
to more and more frequently take the first line of defense, that
there is no coverage extending to the claim.

At any rate, it was

clearly in Home's interest to have no contract exist obligating
Airport to Holiday, because then Airport would not have to look
to Home for indemnity, this putting Home in a home-free position.
For example, the statements as sworn to didn't cover the fact that
cash didn't have to be paid to Airport by Holiday for its share of
the insurance premiums because Holiday had worked those off.
The jury verdict finding Home did have a contractual obligation to extend the insurance to Holiday should be sufficient to
establish that these sworn statements were canted to favor Home.
The question arises as to whose interest was served, that
of the owners of Airport, or that of Home, by their statements
being taken in sworn fashion, not by a Home insurance adjuster
but by an attorney retained and paid by Home but serving in court

and on paper Airport as his client.
The next step taken by Home to favor itself at the expense
of Airport is even more striking.

It must be taken in context.

There was an open question as to whether the Home insurance was
in force covering Airport.

This was closed by the judgment of

Judge Dee based on the jury verdict entered with the consent and
appearance of the attorney for Home and Airport.

Judge Dee found:

"1. Based on the jury's findings set forth above and
the stipulation of counsel to the third party case,
the court finds that the third party defendant, Airport Shuttle Parking, had a contract which obligated
it to have the third party plaintiff, Holiday Rent-ACar, covered under the Airport Shuttle Parkingfs business owner's insurance policy with the Home Insurance
Company, which was in effect on February 29, 1980."
(R295) [Emphasis added.]
Robert L. Stevens, as attorney for Airport and Home, signed
the judgment, "Approved as to Form."

To complete the context, all

the steps necessary to actually have Home cover Holiday had been
taken.

These were:
1. Home had consented to a judgment ruling that its insur-

ance covered Airport on February 29, 19 80.
2. The jury verdict had found that Airport had a contractual obligation to extend that very insurance to Holiday.
3. The lease constituted an "insured

contract" by which,

under the policy terms, and within the policy terms, Airport was
liable to pay any damages arising from a liability claim against
Holiday.
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4. The lease inclusion of the policy had been done unilaterally by Airport and Holiday, but they had acted on the advice
of the agent for Home, Mr, Denning, and after having done so, Mr.
Denning had come to the premises and had approved it. (R386 L14-19)
Notwithstanding, Home took this remarkable step - it filed
a motion for summary judgment, which Judge Daniels heard, alleging
that although Airport had the contractual obligation to extend its
insurance to Holiday, it had breached this obligation.
This position should be considered.
If Airport took the position that it had breached its agreement to extend the insurance, then no insurance from Home applied
to protect either Holiday

or Airport.

That would mean that Air-

port would have to pay Holiday, without assistance from Home.
After all, what the policy provided was not direct named
coverage of Holiday, that being unnecessary, but rather payment
of all claims against Airport resulting from its being "legally
obligated" to "pay" all "damages" because of an "insured contract."
For Airport to claim that it had breached the contract
after it was complete and the insurance coverage in force, which
was clearly the factual situation when Mr. Denning visited, Airport had to have then done something which resulted in the insurance no longer being in force to cover its comiriitment to Holiday.
Shouldn't Airport1s attorney have just referred defense to Holiday
to Home?
It is inconceivable that an attorney would leave his client
uninsured in the factual context that we have here.

The effect

the expense of the client, Airport.
The question arises as to who the client was?
To confirm this, read the language Home's attorney used
in his "Memorandum of Airport Shuttle in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment:
"Under the facts of this case as was determined in
the prior bifurcated trial, being flegally obligated'
to pay 'damages1 because of an 'insurance contract.1
Airport Shuttle entered into a contract with Holiday
under which it was obligated to procure liability
insurance. Airport Shuttle breached this obligation
and procured no such insurance." [Emphasis added.]
(R304)
"In the instant case, it is undisputed that Holiday
Rent-A-Car suffered damage of $15,000 by virtue of
the lack of liability insurance covering it."
[Emphasis added.] (R306)
"As such, Holiday Rent-A-Car's damage from the lack
of insurance is in that amount and any assignment
or other machination of Holiday in conjunction with
the plaintiff cannot increase that damage. [Emphasis
added.] (R315)
In what way did Airport breach its obligation to extend
the insurance to Holiday?
It must be remembered that Airport's assertions of breach
were taken in the context of its Motion for Summary Judgment.

Sum-

mary motion judgments have to be supported by facts, not by allegations * What were these facts?
In speculation, one can consider facts that might have made
the insurance inapplicable notwithstanding Airport having committed
itself to Holiday.

For example, the agent might have been acting

beyond the scope of his authority.

Another possiblity would be

that the premiums had not been paid for the included Holiday
-1 Q -

coverage to Home.

Another possibility would be that the agent,

Mr. Denning, had overstepped his authority.
All of these are specific facts.
In Airport's Memorandum, no fact of any kind was stated
to establish the acts taken by anybody to "breach" Airport's obligation.

(R303-329; R446-460)
That Airport should be plead in court into a position of

being non-insured is even more remarkable in light of the previously
mentioned statements made by the attorney for Airport and Home
before Judge Dee, those statements being made in order to obtain
a favorable ruling for Airport and Home concerning testimony on
insurance.

These statements are set out verbatim as made by the

attorney during that chambers in limine hearing.
"Mr. Stevens: Robert Stevens representing Airport Shuttle
Parking. This is our Motion In Limine. The motion is
to restrict Mr, Lambert on behalf of plaintiffs - or
third party plaintiffs, from offering the testimony of
Mr, Gene Denning, It is our information that Mr. Denning
will testify that he had discussions with the people at
Airport Shuttle, that he told the people at Airport Shuttle
that their insurance policy that at that time they had and
continue to have today would cover them for any liability
they might have if they were to indemnify any of their
tenants by writing on some sort of indemnification or
hold harmless agreement on the lease.
"Our position is that kind of testimony puts before the
Jury an absolute clarity the fact that Mr. Hinckley and
Mr. Howell do have insurance that will or may cover them
if they lose this lawsuit. Our position is that that
kind of testimony is bound to be prejudicial and to
allow it in would be error." (R371 L13-R372 L6)
"(Mr, Stevens) But what I do object to is Mr. Denning
testifying that my clients have insurance that will
cover this agreement." (R374 L21-25)[Emphasis added.]
Notwithstanding the lack of any facts to support this naked

reversal

that Airport had in some way breached its contract,

Judge Daniels was still persuaded that it had.

In his decision

on the opposing motions for summary judgment, he states:
"Since Airport seems willing to concede that it did
breach its agreement to insure Holiday, the question
remains as to the extent of liability for this breach.11
[Emphasis added.] (R487)
Having found that Airport's breach of the contract to Holiday did in fact exist, Judge Daniels then turned, as he indicated,
to the measure of damages.

In doing so, he applied the traditional

measure of damages for an indemnitor who has breached a contract
to an indemnitor to indemnify, which is reimbursement of out-ofpocket expenses of the indemnitee.

He found these to be $15,000

(R485-488), the amount of cash paid plaintiff by Holiday.

In so

doing, he was persuaded not to use the measure of damages appropriate for a failure to insure or defend, although he indicated
in that decision that such would be the full amount of plaintiff's
claim if only Airport had insurance coverage (R487).
These measures of damages are set out with citations in
plaintiff's Argument,Point II.
Thus, at the slight awkwardness of abandoning its client,
Airport, Home succeeded brilliantly in evading the full claim it
had otherwise to pay.
It is so inconceivable that an attorney would concede a
point adverse to his client, when actually the facts entirely
support his client on that point, that a judge simply cannot conceive that the concession is not of necessity.

This undoubtedly

is what led Judge Daniels to accept the concession of Airport that
it in some unnamed way had breached its contract, despite the argument of counsel for plaintiff that Airport had not breached its
contractual obligation, but had fully honored it.
This is a bizarre twist in this lawsuit,.

Usually when one

finds an attorney arguing his client has not fulfilled a contract
caluse, it is because he can justify that conduct and wants the
client to be relieved from the consequences of the contract. Here,
though, the reverse is true, that the consequence was to leave
the lient not only defenseless as to Holiday, but uninsured as
to Home,

Here, the concession was made not to protect the client,

but to protect a person not before the court because not a named
party, Home.
Plaintiff's counsel has never seen this situation arise
before.

No wonder Judge Daniels was misled.
There is yet another instance of Home acting in its own

interest through its attorney, rather than in the interest of Airport.

Again, the context must be set forth.
Before trial of the insurance issue alone before Judge Deef

trial of the whole case was set for October 5, 1982. As the trial
date approached, Holiday and its owners, the Maws and Lingards,
very naturally became frantic.

As the rock, they were facing

plaintiff's very strong liability case.

As the hard place, Home

refused to defend or settle.
This forced Holiday and plaintiff to enter into settlement
negotiations.

Utah had a clear precedent on how a settlement

should be structured to preserve a claim against an insurer,
Ammerman v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 22 U2d 187, 450 P2d 460,
which they carefully followed.
The agreement was that Holiday would assign all of its
rights in the Home Insurance policy and its claims against Airport
to plaintiff, would consent to a default in such figure as the
court approved, would pay plaintiff all the cash it could come
up with, which turned out to be $15,000, would provide counsel at
its own expense in Holiday's name to assist plaintiff in recovering the policy proceeds, and in consideration plaintiff agreed not
to execute on Holiday's assets other than its rights against Airport and Home,
The agreement consisted of two documents, an assignment
(R178-180) and a settlement agreement (R190-193).
The settlement agreement specifically provided plaintiff's
claim far exceeded the $15,000 paid by Holiday, and that it was
only a partial settlement.
The affidavit of Gerald Nielsen (R365-368), attorney for
the Maws, said the only reason that the settlement was made and
Holiday allowed the default judgment to be entered, was that
plaintiff's claim was in an amount that neither Holiday, the
Maws, nor the Lingards could pay, so they had no choice but to
settle due to Home's refusal to defend.

He also states in his

affidavit that the settlement and assignment were submitted to
Home before being executed.

It is not denied that Mr. Stevens,

Home's attorney, was present when the default was submitted to

Judge Fishier and he entered the $246,000-00 judgment.
On Home's motion, Judge Croft entered an order bifurcating
the case on September 30, 1982, five days before the trial of all
issues.

The next day, the parties went before Judge Fishier and

he entered the consent judgment.
Judge Croft's Order was a severe blow to plaintiff.

She

had her witnesses under subpoena, her trial brief prepared.

She

had waited two and a half years from the time of her accident for
her trial.
Airport had been invited to attend the settlement negotiations and to join in the settlement by assigning its rights to the
policy against Home, in exchange for which plaintiff and Holiday
would agree not to execute on any of Airport's other assets.
It was entirely in Airport's interest to accept this proposal.

Had it had independent counsel, it would undoubtedly have

done so.

By doing that, it would have had no exposure for liabi-

lity to Holiday or plaintiff, whether for $15,000 or the entire
amount of plaintiff's judgment, and would have let Home alone
litigate the issues of coverage and damages, as was done by the
insured in Ammerman.
Counsel for plaintiff has repeatedly asked Home, through
its counsel, to acknowledge its conflict of interest and to have
Airport get independent counsel.
so.

This only protected Home.

Home has as often refused to do

It was adverse to Airport*

The time when Airport, as alleged by its counsel, breached
" "* •

.•--!-- _.J

^ A t~r* ^/-VTT^v.arTO ^^ vtnl i^v. had to be before

the date of plaintifffs accident, February 29, 1980.
If the breach were real, Home would have no obligation to
pay Airport or Holiday anything.

Notwithstanding this,

Judge

Dee^ in the second paragraph of his judgment (R225), awarded attorney fees of $3,500 to Holiday.

These were paid forthwith, not

by Airport but by Home.
If Home genuinely believes that Airport breached its obligation to extend the insurance, Home has no involvement in the case.
It would have paid nothing because it would have no obligation to
Holiday to do so.

That Airport had an obligation to Holiday which

it breached does not concern Home, and the insurer does not volunteer money without a liability to do so.
The only conclusion is that Airport's position that it
breached its obligation to Holiday is a sham position. In reality,
Home knows that the insurance covers Airport and extends to plaintiff's claim against Holiday,
Home has obviously made this private, internal decision,
or it would have told Airport of it, Home had no obligation to pay
third party defense fees.
What Home does now is to raise a defense - it isn't liable
for Airport - in order to limit plaintiff's recovery, knowing the
defense is not bona fide.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
RULING THAT THE HOME INSURANCE
COVERS PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM,
For brevity, reference will be made back to the Statement
of Facts when appropriate.
Judge Daniels1 rulings stand this way.

In his first judg-

ment he found that Airport had breached its obligation to extend
its insurance to plaintiff (R485-488).
On plaintiff's motion for re-hearing of that decision,
Judge Daniels, in his second decision, modified his position by
adding an "if."

He stated:

"2. If defendant Airport Shuttle Parking breached
its obligation to provide insurance, it is liable
to the extent of $15,000." (R501 12)
Judge Daniels then gave plaintiff, as assignee of Holiday,
judgment directly, but solely, against Airport in the amount of
$15,000 (R501 24).
Plaintiff's judgment against Airport has not been appealed
by Airport.

The question of what amount that judgment should be,

as preserved by appellants, is covered in Point II.
During the Motions for summary judgment, what was the status
of the facts before the trial court concerning the matter of whether
the Home policy covered plaintifffs claim?
On Airport's side it had conceded that it had breached
its obligation to extend the insurance to Holiday, but had no
facts of any kind to support that {Airport's Memorandums on this

point can be examined at R299-320 and 446-461).

In addition,

Airport's attorney filed his personal affidavit to dispute plaintiff's damages but even though plaintiffs motions had raised the
issue of Airport submitting no facts to prove the "breach," the
attorney's affidavit was silent In rebuttal

(R481-486).

Supporting her Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff
did have facts included in her Motion.

Her Memorandum supporting

her motion is in the Record at pages 331-361.

It includes attach-

ments of the affidavits of plaintiff (R353-355), Dr. Baer (R356361), Mr. Hawkes (362-364), Mr. Nielsen, attorney for the Maws
(R365-368), the lease (R392), the insurance policy (R394-424),
the transcript of Home's counsel's in limine motion (R369-376),
Mr. Denning's testimony (R376-391), the jury verdict before Judge
Dee and Judge Dee's judgment (R426-427).
Plaintiff's facts fall into clusters, each capable of
justifying the relief she sought.
FIRST, JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL.

During the in limine motion,

Airport's attorney sought to obtain a favorable ruling from the
court barring the testimony of the insurance agent, Mr. Denning,
"that my client's have insurance that will cover this agreement."
(Statement of Facts, p. 20).
Judicial estoppel is not based on fraud nor deceit, but
on a party taking inconsistent positions.

The general rule is

stated in 28 AmJur 2d Estoppel and Waiver, §69, p. 696:
"The rule that a party will not be allowed to maintain inconsistent positions is applied in respect
to positions in judicial actions and proceedings.

as thus applied, it may be regarded not strictly
as a question of estoppel, but as a matter in the
nature of a positive rule of procedure based on
manifest justice and to a greater or lesser degree,
on considerations of orderliness, regularity, and
expedition in litigation. Certainly the elements
of reliance and injury, while often considered,
do not enter into such so-called 'estoppel1 to
the same extent that they do in equitable estoppel
proper. The principle requiring consistency in
judicial proceedings is, however, customarily considered a form of equitable estoppel .... . The
rule against inconsistent positions applies generally to positions assumed not only in the course
of the same action or proceeding, but also in proceedings supplemental thereto, including proceedings for review or re-trial and even in separate
actions or proceedings involving the same parties
and questions."
Utah has a case somewhat in point, Tracy Loan & Trust
Company v. Openshaw Inv. Co., et al., 102 U 509, 132 P2d 388,
where a man claimed in a divorce he didn't own stock, so as to
reduce alimony, and in another case that he did own the stock in
order to clear title to it in himself.
The court said concerning judicial estoppel:
"Most of the decided cases hold that the rule may
be invoked only whssre the prior and subsequent litigation involves the same parties, and where one party
has relied on the former testimony and changed his
position by reason of it. In other words, a person
may not, to the prejudice of another person, deny
any position taken in the prior judicial proceedings
between the same persons or their privies involving
the same subject-matter, if such prior position was
sucessfully maintained." (102 Utah at p. 515)
The Record shows that Home's position was successfully
maintained.

It barred the evidence of the agent, Mr. Denning,

in the trial before Judge Dee that the insurance was in fact in
force covering Airport and Holiday both.
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Judge Dee ruled for

Airport holding such questions inadmissible (R376, L9-16, SF
p. 7-8, 20). Home should be held to the in limine statements the Home insurance in fact covers Airport and covers Holiday.
State of Utah, in the Interest of Davis, 28 U2d 428, 503 P2d 1206;
Schneider v. Richardson, 411 A2d 656 (ME 1979);
Holcher v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 409 NE2d 412 (111. 1956).
Similarly, the insurer could be estopped from denying
coverage where the agent has acted properly in advising the insureds that coverage existed.

United Pacific Ins. Co. v. North-

western Ins. Co., 185 F2d 443 (10th Cir. 1950 Ut.)
SECOND, THE LAW APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment had squarely put
the issue before Judge Daniels:
"3, For a determination that both parties, Holiday
Rent-A-Car and defendants Hinckley and Howell d/b/a
Airport Shuttle Parking are covered by insurance
policy B0P8 63 53 46, together with an umbrella
policy in addition, issued by the Home Insurance
Company as insurer, such being responsible for
covering the plaintiff's liability claim in this
case, and both are liable for plaintiff's full
judgment." (R440)
Plaintiff supported her Motion with affidavits, the lease,
the insurance policy and transcripts, as previously stated at
page 27.
Rule 56(e), URCP requires responsive pleadings in Summary
Judgment proceedings to be facts admissible in evidence, not just
allegations and denials.
To plaintiff's facts, Airport and Home submitted no transcript, no documents.

There was no use of the insurance policy

to show that Mr. Denning had misinterpreted, there was no showing

of any kind that premiums had not been paid, no showing to change
the facts conceded by Home!s attorney that its own agent would
state the policy was in force covering Holiday at the time of
plaintiff's accident which thereby bound Home.

United Pacific

Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Ins. Co., supra.
Plaintiff had submitted facts to establish a prima facie
case.

Since none were rebutted, plaintiff was entitled to sum-

mary judgment.

Massey v. Utah Power & Light, (1980) 609 P2d 937.

(Contentions unsupported by specifications of fact do not preclude
entry of summary judgment.

The burden is on a party meeting a

verified motion for summary judgment to submit appropriately
documented facts, not conclusions, if that party is to meet the
burden of showing the presence of a material issue of fact requiring trial.)

Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., (1979)

596 P2d 1025.
THIRD, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE FACTS SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT.
43 AmJr 2d Insurance, §187, p. 270, states the necessary
elements for a binding insurance contract, with appellants submitting within parentheses how each element has been met:
"A contract of insurance must be assented to by both parties either in person or by their agents.

There must be a meet-

ing of the minds of the parties on the essential terms and elements of the contract.

These essential terms and elements in-

clude, in general, (1) an insurer (Home); (2) the subject matter
to be insured or the person insured and his beneficiary (Airport
_ OA—

extending its insurance to cover claims against Holiday); (3)
the risk insured against (fire and liability claims, R392); (4)
the commencement and period of the risk undertaken by the insurer (defined by the terms of the policy between Home and Airport) ; (5) the amount of insurance (also defined by the terms
of the policy between Airport and Home); and (6) the premium,
being the consideration, and the time in which its to be paid
(premium provided in declarations of policy between Home and
Airport,

No point ever raised that additional premium, if due,

was not paid.

See Rasmussen v. Western Casualty & Surety Co,,

15 U2d 333, 393 P2d 376.)
There is no evidence of a missing element.
is complete.

The contract

To do justice to all appellants, this honorable

court is fully within its prerogatives in declaring the insurance
covers

plaintifffs claim.

POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IN
AMOUNT, $246,035,08 AS TO AIRPORT AND HOME
As stated at the outset of Point I of this Argument,
plaintiff submitted the issue to Judge Daniels that she sought
recovery of the full amount of her judgment from Airport and
Home.

Tying in with that, in Point II of that Motion she had

defined the amount of that judgment by asking:
"2. Plaintiff moves the judgment in favor of
plaintiff in the sum of $246,033.08 entered by
Judge Philip R. Fishier on October 1, 1982, be
af f i rmed in amount.ff (R440 )
In Airport's two memoranda supporting its motion and
its rejoinder concerning summary judgment (R303-329; 446-460),
it failed to submit any facts to attack the size of plaintiff's
judgment.

It had taken plaintiff's deposition, and the

deposition of Dr. Robert Burgone, Head of the L.D.S. Hospital
Chronic Pain Clinic, which plaintiff had attended, had
obtained the records from the State Insurance Fund concerning
the breakdown and total on medical and other benefits plaintiff
had received, and had had plaintiff independently examined.
From all of this came nothing admissible in a summary judgment
hearing to support Airport's contention that plaintiff's
judgment was

collusively high.

During progress of the second hearing before Judge
Daniels, Home's attorney submitted his affidavit (R476-481) to
plaintiff and the ccurt.

Plaintiff did not object to that

affidavit on basis of time limits but in glancing at it stated

that it appeared to contain no verified material.

The affi-

davit for example contained the medical report of the doctor
who had dene the independent medical examination on plaintiff.
His report totally missed the diagnosis of fibrocytis.

Being

a letter it was not in affidavit form and so not admissible.
To verify her motion as to damages plaintiff had
submitted Dr. Baer's Affidavit (R181-186), plaintiff's Affidavit
(R187-189) and the Affidavit of her associate counsel, James
Hawkes, explaining how the dollar and cent amount submitted to
Judge Fishier had been arrived at (R362-364), and the Affidavit
of Gerald Nielsen, attorney for the Maws, that the defense had
first been tendered repeatedly to Airport and Home and was a
judgment from necessity, not collusion.

(R365-368)

In sum, as in the previous point, we have plaintiffs'
thoroughly verifying the facts on which Judge Fishier's Summary
Judgment was based.
Opposing this, while we had Home's counsel's Affidavit,
and a plethora of sources available to use for counteraffidavits
if he chose, he has no facts stated which serve as admissible
rebuttal.

Even when he cites figures, he used no transcript

or other sources to verify the figures that he uses.
It must be granted that there was no trial and no crossexamination concerning plaintiff's damages.

This could be a

ground for Airport to ask an extension of time in which to
respond to plaintiff's motion.

Strand v. Associated Students

of University of Utah, (1977) 561 P2d 191. Airport didn't do

so, and the time has now passed.
Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment,
the factual context being ripe, if the law supports her on
damages.
Airport has contended, as ruled by Judge Daniels, that
the measure of liability for one who fails to procure insurance
for another, is indemnity, out-of-pocket expense, rather than
the actual amount of the judgment confessed.

There is some

support for that position in older law, but the modern trend is
that when liability insurance is the issue, the amount of the
policy not what the uninsured defendant can come up with,is the
measure of damage.
Typical is Glovinden Co. v. Blomfield, 562 P2d 1372
(Ariz. 1977).

Insured not defended by insurer settled by paying

$10,000 cash and consenting to a default judgment for $175,000
and the assignment of his policy rights. Affirmed.
"The insured was justified in taking steps
to protect himself...even if it were ruled
that a convenant not to execute by one party
releases another party whose liability was
derivitive, an exception to this rule should
be recognized where the insured made a covenant
in order to protect himself after being abandoned
by the insurer. This is especially true where
the covenant as here expressly reserves that the
plaintiff has every right to proceed against the
insured's insurance carrier...."
First National Indemnity Company v. Mercado, 511 SW2d 354 (Tex.
Civ. Ap. 1974).
"The insured in this case thus had a similar
need to protect himself since he has every reason
to expect that the insurer will refuse to pay any
judgment. The right of the insured to protect

himself has been approved by a leading
authority on insurance law, J. Appleman,
Insurance Law Practice, Section 4514, Page 143.
Note 54.30 (Supp., 1976) has also accepted the
principle that the insured is entitled to protect himself when his insurer refuses to defend...
We hold for the reasons discussed above, insureds
are entitled to summary judgment against the
appellant-insurer.
Deblon v. Beaton, 247 A2d 174 (NJ 1968).

Again involving

a confession of judgment and assignment of rights by an undefended insured, it affirms that indemnity concepts are not
applicable, but rather insurance concepts stating:
M

Thus Jersey (the insurer) argues that plaintiff
is precluded because its liability under its
policy is 'to pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages,1 and its insured
cannot become 'legally obligated' to pay anything
because of the convenant not to execute. Such
conclusions might be tenable if the policy was
one of indemnity against loss rather than insurance
against liability. (Emphasis added)
...Insurance, of course, is an instrument of
social policy that victims of negligence be compensated and such compensation is in the public
interest. The interest of defendant-tort feasors
is to conclude the case within the limits of their
insurance coverage...since the carrier has a duty
to act in good faith where its interests conflict
with those of the insured in connection with
settlement negotiations, it certainly cannot complain about the partial settlement, as in the present
case, after disclaiming and refusing to negotiate at
all. The law, in addition, favors settlements."
Metcalf v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 126
NW2d 471 (Neb. 1964).
"It was evidenced in the record that the judgment
was reasonable and within the range of a possible
jury verdict. The trial court's judgment was
supported by evidence and, if not being clearly
wrong, no basis exists for any interference by this
court with the judgment entered. (Emphasis added)

Fullerton v. United States Casualty Company, 167 NW 700 (Neb.):
"It is a well settled principle where a
person
is responsible over to another, either by
operation of law or express contract, and he is
duly notified of the pendency of the suit against
the person
to whom he is liable, and full opportunity is afforded him to defend the action, a
judgment if obtained without fraud or collusion
will be conclusive against him, whether he appeared
or not. 27 Am Jur Indemnity, Section 35, Page 478,
42 C.J.S. Indemnity, Section 32, Page 613."
American Fidelity & Casualty Company v. Williams, 34 SW2d 396
(Texas Civ. App., 1930).
Jones v. Southern Surety Company, 230 NW 381, (Iowa 1929).
Mid-America Corp. v. Roach, 412 P2d 188 (0klaa 1966).
Granite State Ins. Corp. v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co.,
573 P2d 506 (Ariz. App. 1977).
Robinson v. Janay, 253 A2d 816 (NJ 1969).
Mid-America Corp. v. Arochanvay, 412 P2d 188 (Okla. 1966),
Conestoga Chemical Corp. v. F. H. Simonton Inc., 269 A2d 237
(Del. 1970). Liability of broker who failed to obtain insurance
was precisely the same as that of the insurer.
Johnson v. Smith, 293 SE2d 644 (NC 1982).
Dixie Fire Insurance Company v. American Bonding Company,
78 SE 430 (NC 1913).
Harrell v. Davenport, 299 SE2d 308 (NC 1983),
Wiles v. Mullinax, 148 SE2d 229 (NC 1966).
Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group, 230 Cal Ap 2d 788, 12 ARL 3d 1142.
"It is true that as a general rule when an
insurer whose policy requires it to defend its
insured, receives notice of a suit against him
and is allowed an opportunity to defend, but
refuses, it is bound by the findings and judgment
therein.M McCarty v. Parks, 564 P2d 1122 (Ut. 1977).
Ammerman v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 22 U2d 187, 450 P2d 460:
"This agreement is executory in nature and does
not, as of now, amount to an accord and satisfaction•

The promise of Ammerman (the insured) has net
been fully performed. This court has stated...
the law of accord and satisfaction makes a
distinction between an agreement accepted as a
satisfaction and an agreement whose performance is
to be accepted as satisfaction.
Farmers contends, however, that even though the
agreement is not considered an accord and satisfaction, Ammerman f s claim is nevertheless barred
because he has suffered no damage. He has not
paid the excess judgment or any part thereof.
We are cognizant of the several cases which hold
there must be payment by the insured before he
can maintain against his insurer for the excess
judgment. However, we are of the opinion that the
cases to the contrary (and perhaps the majority)
are the better reasoned.
Three very sound reasons justify the adoption of
this non-payment view, (1) Such view prevents an
insurer from benefiting from the impecuniousness of
an insured who has a meritorious claim but cannot
first pay the judgment imposed upon him; (2) Such
view negates the possibility that the insurer would
be '...less responsive to its trust duties when the
insured is unable to pay the excess judgment. Were
payment the rule, an insurer with an insolvent
insured cculd unreasonably refuse to settle, or, at
worst, it would only be liable for the amount specified by the policy. To permit this would be to impa
the usefulness of insurance for the poor man.' (3)
Such view recognizes that the fact of entry of the
judgment against itself against the insured constitutes real damage to him because of potential harm
to his credit rating."
In regard to the last point in Ammerman, it should b
noted that Holiday is in business.
then rents to customers.

It leases the cars that

The $246,000.00 judgment standing

not only impairs its credit, but impairs its ability to do
business with conservative, business-like entities who will
check its credit and judgments.

Rieth-Riley Const, v. Auto-Owners Mut. Ins., 4-08 NE2d 640 (Ind. 1980)
affirmed a ccnsent default by lessor for $100,000 in a case
where the lessor of the truck was sued when the lessee was
involved in an accident and the lessee had failed to procure
insurance he had agreed to obtain.
other vehicles were $1,000,000.

Policy limits on the lessee's

The court affirmed that the

lessee was liable for the whole amount of the judgment even
though it was uncontested and by default and further awarded
plaintiff attorney fees and interest from the date of the
default judgment because these wouldn't have been incurred if
the lessee had been insured.
As indicated in Ammerman, a majority of states hold
such a judgment is valid.

Typical of the cases so holding

indemnitor-insurer distinctions invalid are the following:
CT

Where either an indemnitor or liability insurer
has notice of a proceeding against his indemnitee
or insured, and is afforded an opportunity to
appear and defend, a judgment rendered against
the indemnitee or insured, in the absence of fraud
or collusion, is conclusive against indemnitor or
insurer as to all material matters determined
therein." Coblentz v. American Surety Co. of New
York, 416 F2d 1059, at 1062 (5 Cir. Fla. 1969).
Possibly the most interesting case, rejecting indemnity
when opposed to a confessed judgment, because of the illustrious
bench, Cardozo, Pound and Lehman, that decided it, is Municipal
Service Real Estate Co. v. D. B. M« Holding Corp, and National
Sugar Refining Co. of New Jersey, 178 NE 745, 78 ALR 323 (NY 1931).
There, the buyer of land sued the seller for a defect in title,
and the seller sued the party who had sold to him because that
was where the defect in title had originated, and the original

seller had given the defendant, an indemnity agreementa

Defense

was tendered to the original seller and refused. Defendant
then confessed judgment.

On appeal, t h e

trial court's

approval of that was affirmed, by Judge Lehman, holding that as
the same facts would win or lose for either defendant or its
indemnitor and the indemnitor refused the tendered defense, it
was bound by a judgment against its indemnitee, "Even though
the defense is feeble or pretended,M
Municipal Service also pointed out what befell plaintiff
here, that to delay the plaintiff's right to trial to try a
controversy between the original and intermediate parties should
not be allowed because of its delay to plaintiff, with harm
to plaintiff being inevitable thereby.
POINT III
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE AND REALISTIC
FOR PLAINTIFF TO HAVE NAMED HOME INSURANCE AS
A DEFENDANT BUT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT DO SO
UNDER EXISTING UTAH LAWo THAT LAW SHOULD NOW
BE CHANGED FOR PARTICULAR CASES.
In Utah, a plaintiff must direct his action against the
actual tortfeasor, not the insurer.

Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P2d

1037 (1971); Christensen v. Peterson, 25 Utah 2d 483 P2d 4-47
(1971).

Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967) .
In those cases where the insurer becomes a real party

in interest through its conduct, it has to be an unnamed real
party in interest to meet these cases.
Home's manuevers against Appellants and Airport are laid
out in the Statement of Facts, pages 15 to 25.

Accordingly, plaintiff should not be barred from relief
against Home because of a failure to name Home Insurance, as
plaintiff cannot do so.
As the record indicates, all appellants have been
careful to keep Home Insurance fully advised, so that no situation
would arise where Home could claim lack of notice prior to acts
affecting it.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST, ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS FROM THE DATE OF HER JUDGMENT
AS AGAINST AIRPORT AND HOME.
The case already has precedent that attorney fees are
proper, Judge Dee having awarded them in favor of Holiday when
it prevailed in obtaining a verdict that Airport was obligated
to insure it

(R295, 112). Nc appeal was taken.

These fees have been paid by Home.
The rationale of Reith-Riley, supra, fully applies,
that it is the duty of the insurer to reimburse the insured
for attorney fees, when those attorneys are hired only because
the insurer fails to defend, or to compel the insurer to pay.
As assignee of Holiday, from the date of Judge Fishier's
judgment, plaintiff has had the same full rights to the policy
that Holiday had, and these should include the same rights to
the reimbursement of fees, together of course with interest
from the date of that judgment and costs.
CONCLUSION
There is the probability, in plaintiff's eyes the
certainty, that Home has toyed with the parties and with the

As indicated by Dr. Baer in his affidavit, the plaintiff
is in such pain that the pain itself disables her from being
able to work .
1980.

She has had to endure Home's maneuvers since

Similarly Holiday and Airport and their owners have had

to put in the time, the expense and worry incident to Home
refusing to insure them.

It is in the interest of justice,

and plaintiff urges, that this case be determined as rapidly
as possible and that Judge Daniels' denial of plaintiff's
Motions for Summary Judgment be set aside, and this ccurt enter
its Order validating the entire amount of her judgment and
extending that judgment to be the liability of Airport and Home
awarding all appellants their costs and fees.
DATED March 26, 1984.
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